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Abstract
	A number of scholars have recently drawn attention to the importance of iteration in scientific research. This paper builds on these previous discussions by drawing a distinction between epistemic and methodological forms of iteration and by clarifying the relationships between them. As defined here, epistemic iteration involves progressive alterations to scientific knowledge claims, whereas methodological iteration refers to an interplay between different modes of research practice. While distinct, these two forms of iteration are related in important ways. Contemporary research on the biological effects of nanomaterials illustrates that methodological iteration can help to “initiate,” “equip,” and “stimulate” epistemic iteration.
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1. Introduction
	A number of scholars have recently drawn attention to the importance of iteration in scientific research. Most notably, Hasok Chang introduced the concept of “epistemic iteration” in his book Inventing Temperature (2004). As a starting-point for developing this concept, he referred to mathematical accounts of iteration, in which successive approximations build on preceding ones. Chang suggested that scientific research frequently displays a similar process, “in which successive stages of knowledge, each building on the preceding one, are created in order to enhance the achievement of certain epistemic goals…. [T]he whole chain exhibits innovative progress within a continuous tradition” (2004, 226). Or, put more informally, “What we have is a process in which we throw very imperfect ingredients together and manufacture something just a bit less imperfect” (Chang 2004, 226). 
Others have previously suggested similar ideas, although they did not explicitly employ the term ‘iteration’. For example, William Wimsatt’s classic article “False Models as Means to Truer Theories” (1987) emphasizes that scientists frequently start with imperfect models that they gradually improve. Similarly, Thomas Nickles (1997) argues that scientific inquiry often displays a “multi-pass” progression, in which researchers repeatedly revisit and rework their starting assumptions. Lindley Darden and I have also argued that scientific discovery and theory change frequently involve making corrections in response to anomalies and errors (Darden 1991; Elliott 2004). The roots of this emphasis on anomalies as a stimulus to replacing or improving theories go back to classic texts like Thomas Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1970) and Larry Laudan’s Progress and Its Problems (1977). Thus, while Chang’s book (2004) focused specifically on the ways in which scientific standards, measurements, and concepts can develop in an iterative fashion, the processes that he described clearly have much in common with the iterative processes of theory change that other philosophers have discussed.
Meanwhile, scholars have also recently emphasized that scientists move in an iterative fashion between multiple methodological “modes” of research (see e.g., O’Malley et al. 2009). Scientists and philosophers have previously focused on hypothesis-testing as the heart of scientific methodology, but they have begun to broaden their attention to other aspects of research practice. For example, building on Ian Hacking’s seminal suggestion that experimentation often involves intervening with phenomena (Hacking 1983), Friedrich Steinle (1997) and Richard Burian (1997) independently introduced the term ‘exploratory experimentation’ to describe experimental practices that focus on identifying regularities or characterizing phenomena rather than testing hypotheses. Laura Franklin (2005) has argued that this exploratory mode of research has become increasingly fruitful in fields like molecular biology, where “high-throughput” instrumentation has enabled the collection of vast swaths of genomic and proteomic information that can be mined for important patterns. This sort of exploratory work can also involve the development of new techniques, the application of old techniques in new situations, and the design of new tools and technoscientific artifacts (see e.g., Baird 2004; Sargent 1995). Both contemporary scientists and philosophers explicitly refer to the interplay between hypothesis testing and these exploratory modes of research practice as a form of iteration (see e.g., Kell and Oliver 2004; O’Malley et al. 2010).
While contemporary scholars have begun to discuss iteration a good deal, however, this paper argues that more clarity is needed about the various forms that it takes. Section 2 argues for distinguishing two concepts: epistemic iteration and methodological iteration. On one hand, epistemic iteration is a process by which scientists revisit their knowledge claims in an effort to improve them. On the other hand, methodological iteration is a process by which scientists move back and forth between particular modes of research. Section 3 argues that once one has distinguished these two concepts at a conceptual level, it becomes clear that these two forms of iteration intertwine in actual scientific practice and serve as crucial engines of scientific progress. Using contemporary research on the biological effects of nanomaterials as a case study, this paper argues that methodological iteration promotes epistemic iteration in at least three ways. First, it can initiate epistemic iteration by helping to provide an initial model, theory, or regularity that can serve as a starting point for subsequent improvement. Second, methodological iteration can equip epistemic iteration by clarifying the nature of scientific problems and suggesting promising ways to revise previous models or theories in response to them. Third, it can stimulate epistemic iteration by helping to identify new problems with existing regularities or models. 

2. Distinguishing Epistemic and Methodological Iteration
As the preceding section emphasized, Hasok Chang has inspired much of the recent interest in iteration among historians and philosophers of science. In his book (2004), he motivates attention to this phenomenon by considering seemingly paradoxical cases in which new standards correct earlier standards from which they were derived. For example, he notes that scientists developed initial confidence in the reliability of thermoscopes by comparing their results with direct human sensations of temperature differences. However, these thermoscopes ultimately allowed for such precise measurements of temperature that they could occasionally correct sense perceptions (Chang 2004, 40-48). According to Chang, the solution to this apparent paradox is to recognize that science proceeds in an iterative fashion that incorporates not only respect for previous standards but also an imperative of progress that motivates improvements to those standards (2004, 44).   
To clarify this iterative process, Chang turns to mathematics, where iteration is defined as “a problem-solving or computational method in which a succession of approximations, each building on the one preceding, is used to achieve a desired degree of accuracy” (Chang 2004, 45). He notes, however, that a crucial difference between iteration in mathematics and iteration in science is that in the former case the iterative process is used to approach a correct answer that can be verified in other ways. In contrast, there is generally no way to verify that a series of iterative improvements in scientific standards, measurements, or concepts is converging on the “true” answer. Nevertheless, Chang emphasizes that scientists do have a number of criteria that they can use to evaluate whether an iterative process is indeed progressive. They can consider whether successive changes to their system of knowledge increases its accuracy, consistency, scope, simplicity, fruitfulness, elegance, unifying power, explanatory power, testability, and neatness. Thus, Chang argues that a process of epistemic iteration in science can be defended based on a coherentist epistemology in which scientists move from a tentative starting point to an improved ending point (2004, 226-228).
While Chang clearly envisioned iteration as a process of revising and improving the outputs of science, other authors have been identifying somewhat different forms of iteration. For example, in our recent essay on iteration in molecular biology research, Maureen O’Malley, Dick Burian, and I (2010) emphasize that scientists move iteratively through different “modes” of research practice. Many recent discussions of scientific methodology have focused on the proposal and testing of hypotheses as the centerpiece of research practice. Partly in reaction to this emphasis, we highlight how scientists working to understand and identify microRNAs moved back and forth between hypothesis testing and a number of other activities, including what we call exploratory inquiry, technology-oriented research, and question-driven investigation (O’Malley et al. 2010, 412-414). 
With respect to exploratory inquiry, we refer to pioneering work by Friedrich Steinle (1997) and Richard Burian (1997), who emphasized that experimental work is often directed not toward the testing of specific hypotheses but rather toward varying experimental parameters with the goal of identifying regularities and characterizing the entities that are responsible for those regularities. We emphasize that research practice also involves the development of new experimental techniques and the modification of old ones, as well as the proposal of open-ended questions that can guide further investigations (O’Malley et al. 2010, 413). One might also identify other “modes” of scientific research, such as the design of new artifacts that can play a role in technological advances. There is room for debate about how to group all these forms of research practice. For example, I previously classified the development of new experimental techniques and instruments as a form of exploratory experimentation (Elliott 2007), whereas our more recent paper describes these as two distinct modes of research practice (O’Malley et al. 2010). For the purposes of the present paper, the precise classification of these activities is less important than the fact that scientific practice involves an iterative process of moving back and forth between practices that incorporate much more than just the testing of hypotheses.
Historians and philosophers are not alone in recognizing these iterative aspects of contemporary scientific research. In 2004, Douglas Kell (now Chief Executive of the Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council of the UK) wrote a paper with Stephen Oliver on the relationships between “inductive” and “hypothesis-driven” research approaches in contemporary biological science (Kell and Oliver 2004). Their central argument was that these two approaches should not be regarded as mutually exclusive alternatives. Instead, they insisted that data- and technology-driven research projects “are complementary and iterative partners” with hypothesis-driven studies (2004, 99, emphasis in original). Similarly, Hiroaki Kitano (2002) has argued that research in the field of systems biology often moves through a cycle with the following stages: (1) data collection, (2) computational efforts to mine the data for important patterns, (3) in silico experiments to screen potential hypotheses, (4) design of “wet” experiments to test particularly promising hypotheses, (5) development of experimental techniques, (6) performance of wet experiments to test hypotheses, and (7) a return to the stage of collecting data. This cycle obviously incorporates a mixture of different research modes, including exploratory inquiry, technology-oriented research, and hypothesis testing.        
Despite this recent interest in the role of iteration in scientific research, there has been little effort to clarify different forms of iteration and the relationships between them. Chang analyzed how the outcomes of science—standards, measurements, and concepts—progress in an iterative fashion; he did not explicitly discuss iteration between different methodological approaches. In contrast, Kell and Oliver (2004) focused on iteration between different methodological approaches and did not focus as explicitly on scientific outcomes. In our 2010 paper, we briefly acknowledge that iteration can be both epistemic and methodological (O’Malley et al. 2010, 414-415), but we do not elaborate on the differences between these two forms of iteration or the details of how they relate to one another.
In response to this lacuna, the remainder of this section clarifies the nature of what will be labeled as “epistemic” and “methodological” iteration, while Section 3 explores the relationships between these two phenomena. For the purposes of this paper, the central characteristic of all forms of iteration is repetition (sometimes after a process of alteration or correction); various forms of iteration differ in terms of what precisely is being repeated or corrected. Epistemic iteration will be defined as a process by which scientific knowledge claims are progressively altered and refined via self-correction or enrichment (see Chang 2004, 228). These knowledge claims could involve theories, models, hypotheses, concepts, measurements, parameters, regularities, or standards. The degree to which these claims are repeated in their same form varies in different instances of epistemic iteration. In some cases, a knowledge claim may be altered only slightly; for example, a model might be tweaked or a theory might be generalized to cover additional phenomena. In other cases, a knowledge claim might be altered almost beyond recognition. Even in these cases of dramatic change, however, repetition occurs in the sense that an initial claim designed to fulfill a task (e.g., explaining or manipulating a particular body of phenomena) is replaced by a new claim designed to serve roughly the same task.​[1]​ 
Methodological iteration will be defined as a process by which scientists move repetitively back and forth between different modes of research practice. This paper follows O’Malley et al. (2010) in using the term ‘modes’ to refer to very general scientific approaches, and it will also follow that article’s suggestion that there are at least four important modes of research practice: (1) hypothesis-driven; (2) exploratory; (3) question-driven; and (4) technology-oriented. As Chang (2004) emphasizes, epistemic iteration is progressive in character, insofar as a set of epistemic values can be used to evaluate the changes made to knowledge claims. Methodological iteration is progressive only in a derivative sense, insofar as it can contribute to progressive changes in knowledge claims. 
Careful readers will notice that epistemic and methodological iteration as defined here do not exhaust the many forms of iteration associated with scientific practice. For example, one might worry that the definition of epistemic iteration in this paper reflects a general philosophical tendency to focus on propositions rather than on the material elements of science, such as instruments. If one were to follow Davis Baird (2004) in claiming that technological artifacts can be bearers of knowledge, one might want to include the iterative design of improved artifacts as a form of epistemic iteration. Another source of concern is that the definition of methodological iteration in this paper leaves out a variety of other forms of iteration associated with scientific methodology. For example, researchers sometimes repeat part or all of their experiments, both to verify their results (or the results of others) and to tweak their protocols. This form of iteration has been widely discussed in the past (see e.g., Collins 1992), whereas the present paper contends that we could learn a great deal by focusing more attention on the iteration that occurs between different modes of research practice. Another form of scientific iteration, which seems largely distinct from the forms of epistemic and methodological iteration discussed here, occurs between social values and scientific knowledge. Social values arguably influence the questions that scientists ask and the ways they interpret their findings, and scientific knowledge in turn influences social values (see e.g., Kitcher 2001; Lacey 1999).
The lesson to draw from these observations is that there are many different forms of iteration in scientific practice. Some of them (such as the relationships between scientific knowledge and social values) are very different from the forms of iteration discussed here. Others (such as the tweaking of experimental protocols or the development of technoscientific artifacts) could potentially be classified as forms of epistemic or methodological iteration if one adopted appropriately expanded definitions. The goal of this paper is not to provide a definitive taxonomy of different forms of iteration in science. The relatively narrow definitions adopted here (i.e., focusing on knowledge claims and modes of research) are chosen because they reflect the forms of iteration that have already received attention from both philosophers (e.g., Chang 2004; O’Malley et al. 2010) and scientists (e.g., Kell and Oliver 2004; Kitano 2002). This paper considers the relationships between these narrowly defined categories of iteration in greater detail, which may pave the way for broader studies of other forms of iteration.       

3. How Methodological Iteration Contributes to Epistemic Iteration
In order to better appreciate how epistemic and methodological iteration relate to each other, this section examines the interplay between them in contemporary research on the biological effects of nanomaterials, especially carbon nanotubes. Nanoscale science and technology has been heavily funded around the world throughout the past decade, partly because nations do not want to be left behind in the race for the next great technological breakthrough. Nanotechnology is frequently defined as the manipulation of matter at the scale of roughly one to 100 nanometers. A nanometer is roughly the size of 10 hydrogen atoms lined up next to each other, and materials frequently display new properties in that size range. Much of this research is a natural progression of previous research in chemistry and materials science. For example, nanotechnologists have explored the novel properties displayed by nanoscale particles of common substances such as silver, gold, and titanium dioxide (see e.g., Royal Society 2004). Other aspects of nanotechnology research are more dramatic and revoluationary. For example, some researchers hope to be able to create nanoscale robots (nanobots) that could perform delicate medical or environmental functions (see e.g., Drexler 1986). One of the important areas of nanoscale research to date has been the development of spheres and tubes made out of carbon. These buckyballs and nanotubes are of great interest in part because they display impressive mechanical and electromagnetic properties that could facilitate the creation of stronger materials and better electronics (Ratner and Ratner 2003).
Unfortunately, many researchers and non-governmental organizations (NGO’s) have expressed concerns about the potential for nanomaterials to display novel toxic properties (e.g., Friends of the Earth 2006; Royal Society 2004). Because they are so small, nanoparticles display greater potential to pass through the skin and even the blood-brain barrier. Their small size also makes them more reactive, which tends to increase both their toxicity and their ability to bind with other harmful compounds that they can carry with them. Some nanomaterials, such as carbon nanotubes, have additional potential for toxicity because of their shape. The long, thin structure of nanotubes resembles asbestos and may enable them to cause similar damage to lung tissue (Friends of the Earth 2006; Royal Society 2004). 
In response to these toxicity concerns, scientists have been working to develop a better understanding of nanomaterials and their biological effects. There are many factors that make this a challenging area of inquiry. First, it has been difficult to manufacture standardized nanoparticles with consistent features. Second, it can be difficult to detect nanoparticles and to measure their characteristics (especially when they are in the environment or in living organisms) using currently available instrumentation. Third, scientists are frequently unsure whether particular variables (e.g., the agglomeration state or the preparation process) alter a nanoparticle’s toxicity. Because of these and other difficulties, this area of research serves as a rich illustration of the ways in which iterative scientific practices can be employed in challenging scientific contexts. The following sub-sections highlight the role of iteration in this case study and specifically show how methodological iteration can contribute to epistemic iteration in at least three ways: initiating it, equipping it, and stimulating it.
Initiating Epistemic Iteration
The first way in which methodological iteration can contribute to epistemic iteration is by “initiating” it. In other words, methodological iteration can assist in the development of a starting point (e.g., an initial model, regularity, or concept) that can subsequently be enriched or corrected through further inquiry. This potential for multiple research modes to assist in generating new regularities and concepts has frequently been discussed by Friedrich Steinle in his descriptions of exploratory experimentation (e.g., Steinle 1997; Steinle 2002). 
In the case of nanotechnology, this ability for methodological iteration to initiate epistemic iteration is important because nanotoxicologists do not yet have a clear framework or model for predicting the variables that will affect a nanoparticle’s toxicity. Traditionally, toxicologists have found that the toxicity of a substance is roughly proportional to its dose (measured in terms of mass concentration). In the case of nanoparticles, however, it appears to be the case that decreasing the mass concentration of a particular nanomaterial can still result in the same or even increased toxic effects if the surface area of the administered material increases (e.g., if smaller particles are administered). Thus, scientists need to develop a new framework for predicting nanoparticle toxicity, a framework that they can subsequently refine through a process of epistemic iteration.  In 2005, an expert working group examined this situation and lamented that there are a host of particle characteristics that could potentially play a role in a framework for predicting nanoparticle toxicity: dose concentration (measured in surface area or the number of particles and not just in mass), size distribution, shape, composition, surface chemistry, surface contamination, surface charge, crystal structure, particle physicochemical structure, agglomeration state, porosity, method of production, preparation process, heterogeneity, and prior storage of the material (Oberdörster et al. 2005).
In an effort to clarify this situation, the expert working group suggested an agenda of exploratory inquiry (i.e., varying experimental parameters in an effort to identify regularities) that will assist in generating hypotheses about the most important variables that influence nanoparticle toxicity. There are three major elements of the exploratory agenda laid out by the working group (Oberdörster et al. 2005): (1) variation and measurement of a wide variety of particle characteristics; (2) in vitro studies of the effects of these particles on multiple tissue types; and (3) in vivo studies of the effects of the particles in multiple animal models. The motivation behind varying and measuring a wide variety of particle characteristics is to obtain a rough sense of which characteristics are most predictive of toxicity. The use of multiple tissue types in vitro (e.g., spleen, liver, blood, nervous system, heart, and kidney) is designed to determine whether there are particular tissue types that are particularly sensitive to nanomaterials. The in vivo studies of nanoparticle effects include even more variables (e.g., multiple exposure routes) as well as numerous biological endpoints. In essence, nanotoxicologists are trying to vary as many experimental parameters as possible in an effort to identify important regularities.
But the methodological iteration in this case involves more than just an interplay between exploratory research strategies and hypothesis-testing. In order to perform the exploratory studies suggested by the expert working group, researchers are also engaging in what O’Malley et al. (2010) call technology-oriented research. For example, the report from another workshop on nanotoxicology emphasizes the importance of developing better experimental systems and instrumentation (Balbus et al. 2007). The report points out that relatively quick and easy in vitro assays or screening techniques are needed to collect exploratory data as efficiently as possible, but these methodologies are insufficiently developed at present.  Oberdörster et al. (2005) also recommend that in vitro toxicology results be used to design more effective computational simulations. Computational simulations would provide another avenue for researchers to collect exploratory data about potential nanoparticle toxicity as quickly as possible. Thus, contemporary nanotoxicology research illustrates how an interplay between exploratory, hypothesis-testing, and technology-oriented modes of research (i.e., methodological iteration) can help researchers as they seek a preliminary framework or model for predicting nanoparticle toxicity (thereby initiating a future process of epistemic iteration).       
Equipping Epistemic Iteration
Methodological iteration can also “equip” epistemic iteration, in the sense that it can help to isolate and clarify problems with existing knowledge claims, thereby suggesting promising avenues for revising them in response to those problems. This process of isolating and clarifying problems is much like what Darden called “localizing” anomalies and what Elliott (building on Mayo 1996) called “probing” for errors (Darden 1991; Elliott 2004). By clarifying the nature of their problems, researchers are better able to develop corrected knowledge claims that solve the errors associated with previous iterations. Consider, for example, the difficulties faced by researchers who have been studying the biological effects of carbon nanotubes. Following the advice of the expert working group discussed in the previous sub-section, researchers have been examining the toxicity of carbon nanotubes in a wide variety of contexts. Unfortunately, they have obtained widely varying results that are sometimes difficult to reconcile. Recent efforts to isolate the sources of these surprising results illustrate how methodological iteration can help to pinpoint problems, thereby “equipping” epistemic iteration.
Consider some of the confusing results obtained in recent years. One study found that carbon nanotubes appeared to produce asbestos-like pathology in mice (Poland et al. 2008). Another study found no obvious toxic effects of nanotubes and concluded that they were promising candidates for use in drug delivery systems (Liu et al. 2008). Other studies concluded that nanotubes were toxic only if they were not purified (Templeton et al. 2006; Pulskamp et al. 2007), while a different study found that refined nanotubes were more toxic than their unrefined counterparts (Tian et al. 2006). Still other studies concluded that at least some apparently toxic effects were the result of misleading artifacts produced by nanoparticle intereference with the assays used to study toxicity (Monteiro-Riviere and Inman 2006; Wörle-Knirsch et al. 2006). Finally, some research indicated that carbon nanotubes were more toxic when functionalized (i.e., when additional chemical groups were added to the tubes), whereas other research indicated that they were less toxic when functionalized (Magrez et al. 2006; Sayes et al. 2006).
Researchers have suggested a range of possible explanations for these surprising findings (see e.g., Hurt et al. 2006). One possibility is that the carbon nanotubes themselves are not toxic but that solutions containing nanotubes are toxic when they include impurities associated with the production process (e.g., heavy metals or other carbon fragments). Another possibility is that the toxicity of nanotubes varies depending on the extent to which they are agglomerated, so seemingly inconsistent results arise because the nanotubes are not equally dispersed in different studies. A third possibility is that nanotubes interfere with the assays typically used to test for toxicity, and this leads to misleading results. It is plausible that a combination of these and other problems could all be operating.
Methodological iteration has played an important role in exploring these potential problems and clarifying precisely what has gone wrong with previous studies. In the course of their research on these difficulties, scientists have been guided by very general questions such as “To what extent are impurities responsible for misleading toxicity results?” or “To what extent are carbon nanotubes interfering with the assays used to measure their toxicity?” In an effort to answer these questions, researchers have engaged in a variety of exploratory studies in order to gather more data. For example, they have compared the toxicity of carbon nanotube preparations that were purified to varying extents, they have studied the behavior of control materials like carbon black with a range of different toxicity assays, and they have compared the toxicity of carbon nanotubes themselves with multiple assays (see e.g., Monteiro-Riviere and Inman 2006; Wörle-Knirsche et al. 2006). In the remainder of this sub-section, I want to focus on one particular question that guided a number of recent studies: “Could nanoparticles be interfering with common toxicity tests by binding to some of the chemicals used in the assays?” (see Casey et al. 2007). As O’Malley et al. (2010) previously argued, this sort of general research question is much less specific than a typical hypothesis. Rather than making a focused prediction, it launches researchers on a set of inquiries.
Scientists have pursued a range of investigations in an effort to answer this question. In one study, they used spectroscopic analyses to examine the extent to which carbon nanotubes do indeed bind to a range of dyes used in common toxicity assays (Casey et al. 2007). Another group of researchers pursued a classic exploratory study that varied a range of parameters. They measured the apparent toxicity of several different nanoparticles (carbon nanotubes, buckyballs, carbon black and quantum dots) with ten different assays, studying the apparent toxicity with each assay (Monteiro-Riviere et al. 2009). Still other researchers examined specific assay systems in great detail, examining the mechanisms by which nanotubes might be interfering with them (see e.g., Kroll et al. 2009). 
In a recent review article, Alexandra Kroll and her coauthors (2009) summarized the fruits of all this question-driven and exploratory research. Not only have researchers found that nanoparticles can indeed bind to some of the chemicals used in common assays, but they have identified the mechanisms by which particular nanomaterials alter specific assays. To take just one example, they have found that single-walled carbon nanotubes reduce normal indications of cell viability in assays that use the dye MTT, because the nanotubes adsorb the MTT and remove it from solution (Wörle-Knirsch et al. 2006). Moreover, these detailed studies have helped toxicologists to refine their initial research question by showing that nanomaterials can invalidate toxicity studies through other mechanisms besides binding to chemicals used in the assays. For example, some nanoparticles display optical properties that alter the assay readouts, others engage in chemical reactions with substances used in the assays, still others affect toxicity tests by altering the pH of the solution, and yet more generate magnetic fields that interfere with the tests (Kroll et al. 2009).  
The goal of clarifying all these problems associated with current in vitro toxicity assays is to identify tests that produce valid results with nanomaterials, thereby enabling scientists to correct incorrect claims about nanoparticle toxicity. Unfortunately, Alexandra Kroll and her colleagues note that there is currently a “lack of standardized test systems” that remain unaffected by “nanospecific properties” (2009, 374). Thus, they call for what this paper calls technology-oriented research; they encourage efforts to develop new testing systems that rely on cell properties such as electrical resistance or refractive index. Because these tests do not depend on cellular reactions with dyes or other chemicals, they are less likely to be invalidated by the unique properties of nanoparticles. Thus, Kroll et al. (2009) call for future in vitro toxicity studies to be performed with these promising new testing systems and with “reference” nanomaterials that have been more precisely characterized.
Thus, we see in this case that methodological iteration is equipping epistemic iteration both by clarifying at least one of the major problems that was responsible for conflicting findings and also by suggesting ways to resolve it. The methodological iteration in this case involves an interplay between exploratory, question-driven, and technology-oriented inquiry. Exploratory research yielded preliminary data that helped researchers arrive at a promising question (i.e., “Could nanoparticles be interfering with common toxicity tests by binding to some of the chemicals used in the assays?”). This question then guided a range of subsequent studies. Many of these further studies were also exploratory, insofar as they were designed to study the behavior of multiple nanomaterials and assay components in an effort to identify their characteristics. As research continued, the initial guiding question was refined, because researchers identified new ways that nanomaterials could interfere with common toxicity tests besides binding to the assay chemicals. Finally, in order to resolve the difficulties with previous studies and arrive at more reliable estimates of nanoparticle toxicity in the future, scientists are engaging in technology-oriented research to develop assays that do not succumb to the major problems associated with previous techniques.           
Stimulating Epistemic Iteration 
	A third way in which methodological iteration can contribute to epistemic iteration is by “stimulating” it. In other words, moving between multiple modes of research can assist in discovering problems or collecting new pieces of information that require altering or enriching former knowledge claims. Although the processes of equipping and stimulating epistemic iteration as described in this paper are not entirely distinct, they differ insofar as the former focuses on isolating an anomaly or error and determining how to respond to it, whereas the latter involves discovering anomalies or errors that require further investigation. For example, the previous sub-section described how researchers isolated and characterized a specific error: some toxicity assays produce misleading results because of interactions between carbon nanotubes and chemicals used in the assays. As some researchers began to reflect on these findings, they launched into a new process of methodological iteration that led to the realization that previous assumptions about carbon nanotube toxicity may need to be revised (in other words, further epistemic iteration may be required). Specifically, whereas researchers had previously assumed that nanotubes exerted toxicity solely through direct effects on the affected cells, it has become increasingly plausible that they might also (or instead) produce indirect toxicity through mechanisms such as the depletion of micronutrients. This sub-section describes this process by which methodological iteration has stimulated epistemic iteration. Future efforts at methodological iteration may enable researchers to clarify the nature of this indirect toxicity further, thereby engaging in a new round of equipping epistemic iteration.
	When Robert Hurt and his colleagues at Brown University realized that nanotubes were binding to many of the organic materials used in common assays, a new research question occurred to them: “Could nanotubes induce indirect toxicity, not by directly damaging cells but rather by binding components of the culture medium and thereby depleting cells of micronutrients?” (Guo et al. 2008). Guided by this question, they embarked on an exploratory research project. They worked “to quantify the effect of CNT [i.e., carbon nanotube] exposure on a wide range of small-molecule solutes in cell culture medium” (721). They found that numerous materials in the medium did in fact adsorb to the nanotubes. After thinking about which micronutrients are most physiologically important, they arrived at the hypothesis that part of the toxicity displayed by carbon nanotubes might occur because they bind folate. They reasoned that if the nanotubes were removing folate from cell culture media, the cells might die from being deprived of this important micronutrient. In order to test this hypothesis, Hurt and his colleagues added additional folate to the cell medium and found that it alleviated much (though not all) of the toxicity in at least some assays (Guo et al. 2008). In a complementary study, a research group based at the Dublin Institute of Technology dispersed carbon nanotubes in a cell culture medium that did not contain cells. After removing the nanotubes from the medium (which had become depleted of micronutrients), they added cells and found that they appeared to experience toxicity from the depleted medium (Casey et al. 2008). 
These studies illustrate how methodological iteration can stimulate epistemic iteration by highlighting problems that may require changes to previous knowledge claims. In this case, the crucial problem is that nanotubes may produce toxic effects not only through direct pathways but also through indirect pathways. As the researchers at the Dublin Institute of Technology concluded, “[T]here is the risk that toxicity observations to date have contained a contribution from this indirect effect, i.e. a false positive result rather than the inherent toxicity of the nanomaterial” (Casey et al. 2008). This finding stemmed from a combination of question-driven research, exploratory inquiry, and hypothesis testing. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, this realization (i.e., that nanotubes can induce indirect toxicity) is likely to stimulate a subsequent round of methodological iteration geared toward equipping epistemic iteration. In other words, researchers will presumably ask questions like, “To what extent, and under what specific conditions, are the apparent toxic effects of nanomaterials actually caused by indirect mechanisms of toxicity?” They are also likely to engage in exploratory research designed to isolate the range of micronutrients that are most likely to bind to carbon nanotubes and that are most responsible for their indirect toxicity.            

4. Conclusion
	This paper has attempted to elucidate the role of iteration in scientific research. Section 2 distinguished epistemic iteration from methodological iteration. It defined epistemic iteration as a process by which knowledge claims are corrected or enriched, and it defined methodological iteration as a process of moving back and forth between different modes of research practice (e.g., hypothesis-testing versus exploratory inquiry). Section 2 also clarified that there are other forms of iteration involved in scientific practice. Some of these, such as the process of iteratively refining technoscientific artifacts, could plausibly fall under broader definitions of epistemic or methodological iteration. Other processes, such as iteration between scientific claims and social values, constitute very different phenomena. The present paper employed relatively narrow definitions of epistemic and methodological iteration for the purposes of building more effectively on recent philosophical and scientific work on the topic of scientific iteration while inspiring broader studies in the future.
	Section 3 analyzed the relationships between epistemic and methodological iteration. Based on an analysis of recent research concerning the biological effects of nanomaterials, it argued that methodological iteration can contribute to epistemic iteration in at least three ways. First, it can initiate epistemic iteration by helping to provide initial knowledge claims that can serve as starting points for subsequent improvement. For example, an interplay of exploratory, hypothesis-testing, and technology-oriented modes of research are being employed by current researchers in an effort to develop a general framework or model for predicting nanoparticle toxicity. Second, methodological iteration can equip epistemic iteration by clarifying the nature of problems with previous knowledge claims and suggesting promising ways to revise them. For example, by employing exploratory, question-driven, and technology-oriented inquiry, researchers have determined that the results of specific toxicity studies should not be trusted because nanotubes interfere with the assays in particular ways. Third, methodological iteration can stimulate epistemic iteration by highlighting the existence of important problems with existing knowledge claims. For example, a combination of exploratory inquiry, question-driven research, and hypothesis-testing have suggested that at least some previous claims about nanotube toxicity may need to be revised in light of the potential for nanotubes to induce toxic effects through indirect mechanisms. 





Baird, D. (2004), Thing Knowledge: A Philosophy of Scientific Instruments. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Balbus J., et al. (2007), “Hazard Assessment for Nanoparticles: Report from an Interdisciplinary Workshop,” Environmental Health Perspectives 115: 1654-1659.
Burian, R. (1997), “Exploratory Experimentation and the Role of Histochemical Techniques in the Work of Jean Brachet, 1938-1952,” History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 19: 27-45.
Casey, A., E. Herzog, M. Davoren, F. Lyng, H. Byrne, G. Chambers (2007), “Spectroscopic Analysis Confirms the Interactions between Single Walled Carbon Nanotubes and Various Dyes Commonly Used to Assess Cytotoxicity,” Carbon 45: 1425-1432.
Casey, A., E. Herzog, F. Lyng, H. Byrne, G. Chambers, and M. Davoren (2008), “Single Walled Carbon Nanotubes Induce Indirect Cytotoxicity by Medium Depletion in A549 Lung Cells,” Toxicology Letters 179: 78-84.
Chang, H. (2004), Inventing Temperature: Measurement and Scientific Progress. New York: Oxford University Press.
Collins, H. (1992), Changing Order: Replication and Induction in Scientific Practice. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Darden, L. (1991), Theory Change in Science. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Drexler, E. (1986), Engines of Creation: The Coming Era of Nanotechnology. New York: Anchor Books.
Elliott, K. (2004), “Error as Means to Discovery,” Philosophy of Science 71: 174-197.
Elliott, K. (2007), “Varieties of Exploratory Experimentation in Nanotoxicology,” History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 29: 311-334.  
Franklin, L. (2005), “Exploratory Experiments,” Philosophy of Science (Proceedings) 72: 888-899.
Friends of the Earth (2006), Nanomaterials, Sunscreens, and Cosmetics: Small Ingredients, Big Risks. Available at http://www.foe.org/pdf/nanocosmeticsreport.pdf (​http:​/​​/​www.foe.org​/​pdf​/​nanocosmeticsreport.pdf​), accessed on Sept. 17, 2011.
Guo, L., A. Von Dem Bussche, M. Buechner, A. Yan, A. Kane, R. Hurt (2008), “Adsorption of Essential Micronutrients by Carbon Nanotubes and the Implications for Nanotoxicity Testing,” Small 4: 721-727.
Hacking, I. (1983), Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hurt, R., M. Monthioux, and A. Kane (2006), “Toxicology of Carbon Nanomaterials: Status, Trends, and Perspectives on the Special Issue,” Carbon 44: 1028-1033.
Kell, D. B. and S. G. Oliver (2004), “Here Is the Evidence, Now What Is the Hypothesis? The Complementary Roles of Inductive and Hypothesis-Driven Science in the Post-Genomic Era,” BioEssays 26: 99-105.
Kitano, H. (2002), “Computational systems biology,” Nature 420: 206-210.
Kitcher, P. (2001), Science, Truth, and Democracy. New York: Oxford University Press.
Kroll, A., M. Pillukat, D. Hahn, J. Schnekenburger (2009), “Current in Vitro Methods in Nanoparticle Risk Assessment: Limitations and Challenges,” European Journal of Pharmaceutics and Biopharmaceutics 72: 370-377.
Kuhn, Thomas (1970), The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.  2nd ed.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Lacey, H. (1999), Is Science Value Free? London: Routledge.
Laudan, L. (1977), Progress and Its Problems.  Berkeley: University of California Press.
Liu, Z., et al. (2008), “Drug Delivery with Carbon Nanotubes for In vivo Cancer Treatment,” Cancer Research 68: 6652-6660.
Magrez, A., et al. (2006), “Cellular Toxicity of Carbon-Based Nanomaterials,” Nano Letters 6: 1121-1125.
Mayo, D. (1996), Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Monteiro-Riviere, N. and A. Inman (2006), “Challenges for Assessing Carbon Nanomaterial Toxicity to the Skin,” Carbon 44: 1070-1078.
Monteiro-Riviere, N., A. Inman, and L. Zhang (2009), “Limitations and Relative Utility of Screening Assays to Assess Engineered Nanoparticle Toxicity in a Human Cell Line,” Toxicology and Applied Pharmacology 234: 222-235.
Nickles, T. (1997), “A Multi-Pass Conception of Scientific Inquiry”, Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 32: 11-44.
Oberdörster, G., et al. (2005), “Principles for Characterizing the Potential Human Health Effects from Exposure to Nanomaterials: Elements of a Screening Strategy,” Particle and Fibre Toxicology 2: 8.
O’Malley, M., K. Elliott, and R. Burian (2010), “From Genetic to Genomic Regulation: Iterative Methods in miRNA Research,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 41: 407-417.
O’Malley, M., K. Elliott, C. Haufe, and R. Burian (2009), “Philosophies of Funding,” Cell 138 (2009): 611-615.
Poland, C. et al. (2008), “Carbon Nanotubes Introduced into the Abdominal Cavity of Mice Show Asbestos-Like Pathogenicity in a Pilot Study,” Nature Nanotechnology 3: 423-428.
Pulskamp, K., S. Diabate, and H. F. Krug (2007), “Carbon Nanotubes Show No Signs of Acute Toxicity but Induce Intracellular Reactive Oxygen Species in Dependence on Contaminants,” Toxicology Letters 168: 58-74. 
Ratner M. and E. Ratner (2003), Nanotechnology: A Gentle Introduction to the Next Big Idea. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Rheinberger, H.-J. (2009), “Experimental Reorientations,” in G. Hon, J. Schickore, and F. Steinle (eds.), Going Amiss in Experimental Research. Springer, p. 75-90.
Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering, UK, 2004, Nanoscience and Nanotechnologies, available at: http://www.nanotec.org.uk/finalReport.htm (​http:​/​​/​www.nanotec.org.uk​/​finalReport.htm​).
Sargent, R.-M. (1995), “Exploratory Experiments: Scientists at Play,” unpublished manuscript of a History of Science Society lecture.
Sayes, C. et al. (2006), “Functionalization Density Dependence of Single-Walled Carbon Nanotubes Cytotoxicity in Vitro,” Toxicology Letters 161: 135-142.
Steinle, F. (1997), ‘Entering New Fields: Exploratory Uses of Experimentation’, Philosophy of Science (Proceedings), 64: S65-S74.
Steinle, F. (2002), ‘Experiments in History and Philosophy of Science’, Perspectives on Science, 10: 408-432.
Templeton, R., P. L. Ferguson, K. Washburn, W. Scriven, G. T. Chandler (2006), “Life-Cycle Effects of Single-Walled Carbon Nanotubes (SWNTs) on an Estuarine Meiobenthic Copepod,” Environmental Science and Technology 40: 7387-7393.
Tian, F., D. Cui, H. Schwarz, G. G. Estrada, and H. Kobayashi (2006), “Cytotoxicity of Single-Wall Carbon Nanotubes on Human Fibroblasts,” Toxicology in Vitro 20: 1202-1212.
Wimsatt, W. (1987), “False Models as Means to Truer Theories,” in Matthew Nitecki and Antoni Hoffman (eds.) Neutral Models in Biology. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 23-55.
Wörle-Knirsch, J. M., K. Pulskamp, and H. F. Krug (2006), “Oops They Did It Again! Carbon Nanotubes Hoax Scientists in Viability Assays,” Nano Letters 6: 1261-1268.

               




^1	  Admittedly, scientific investigations may sometimes indicate that even the tasks that scientists previously set for themselves are not particularly productive. It might seem that nothing is being repeated in cases of epistemic iteration where scientists even alter the tasks that they pursue. However, even in these cases, there is usually some form of repetition, in the sense that the scientific community starts with particular claims about a domain of phenomena and then, after further investigation, returns to those or related phenomena with new approaches, questions, or perspectives.   
